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RESEARCH ARTICLE
To covet what we see: Autistic traits modulate the relationship
between looking and choosing
Nicholas Hedger and Bhismadev Chakrabarti
Behavioral studies indicate that autistic traits predict reduced gaze toward social stimuli. Moreover, experiments that
require participants to make an explicit choice between stimuli indicate reduced preferences for social stimuli in individ-
uals with high autistic traits. These observations, in combination, fit with the idea that gaze is actively involved in the
formation of choices—gaze toward a stimulus increases the likelihood of its subsequent selection. Although these aspects
of gaze and choice behavior have been well characterized separately, it remains unclear how autistic traits affect the rela-
tionship between gaze and socially relevant choices. In a choice-based eye-tracking paradigm, we observed that autistic
traits predict less frequent and delayed selection of social stimuli. Critically, eye tracking revealed novel phenomena
underlying these choice behaviors: first, the relationship between gaze and choice behavior was weaker in individuals
with high autistic traits—an increase in gaze to a stimulus was associated with a smaller increase in choice probability.
Second, time-series analyses revealed that gaze became predictive of choice behaviors at longer latencies in observers with
high autistic traits. This dissociation between gaze and choice in individuals with high autistic traits may reflect wider
atypicalities in value coding. Such atypicalities may predict the development of atypical social behaviors associated with
the autism phenotype. Autism Res 2020, 00: 1–12. © 2020 The Authors. Autism Research published by International
Society for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals LLC.
Lay Summary: When presented with multiple stimuli to choose from, we tend to look more toward the stimuli we later
choose. Here, we found that this relationship between looking and choosing was reduced in individuals with high autis-
tic traits. These data indicate that autistic traits may be associated with atypical processing of value, which may contrib-
ute to the reduced preferences for social stimuli exhibited by individuals with autism.
Keywords: attention; autism; eye tracking; gaze; social attention; temporal modeling
Introduction
A large body of evidence indicates that individuals with
autism exhibit reduced tendencies to seek and exchange
information about other people. This constitutes part of
the diagnostic criteria for autism spectrum disorders
(ASDs) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Several
dominant models propose that early motivational and
attentional social deficits could disrupt the developmental
framework for complex social and cognitive processes to
develop later in life (Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin, &
Schultz, 2012; Toth, Munson, Meltzoff, & Dawson, 2006).
As a spectrum disorder, traits associated with ASD are
observed to varying degrees throughout the population
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley,
2001). As such, one approach to studying autism is to
investigate how autistic traits predict behaviors. This
approach is motivated by the observation that autistic
traits are associated with similar aetiologies at extreme
ends (Robinson et al., 2011). Dimensional approaches
are more methodologically tractable than case–control
designs and have good explanatory power in generalizing
findings to clinical samples (Bölte, Westerwald, Holtmann,
Freitag, & Poustka, 2011; Chandler et al., 2007; Stevenson
et al., 2018) .
Historically, eye tracking has provided a valuable tool
for studying the autism phenotype (Howard, Zhang, &
Benson, 2019). Gaze provides an online, behavioral corre-
late of cognitive processes. However, most research exam-
ining the relationship between gaze behavior and autistic
traits has focused on atypical visual behavior during free-
viewing tasks (Chita-Tegmark, 2016; Frazier et al., 2017;
Klin, Lin, Gorrindo, Ramsay, & Jones, 2009), or tasks with
“correct” answers, such as identifying emotional expres-
sions (Pelphrey et al., 2002; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley, &
Piven, 2007). These studies generally indicate that autistic
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traits are associated with reduced attention to or abnor-
mal sampling of social stimuli.
By contrast, little is known about whether these atypical
gaze behaviors extend to subjective decisions that are
highly relevant to social behavior. Humans frequently
encounter situations that require explicit, subjective
choices to be made between social and nonsocial rewards.
For example, an individual may be faced with a choice
between meeting friends, or staying at home to play with
toys. Indeed, when presented with analogous situations in
experimental contexts, individuals with high autistic traits
invest less effort to obtain social rewards (Dubey, Ropar, &
de C Hamilton, 2017; Dubey, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2015;
Traynor, Gough, Duku, Shore, & Hall, 2019). Understand-
ing the mechanisms underlying such choices is highly rel-
evant to the autism phenotype.
Such an investigation is also timely because it is now
established that there are strong reciprocal links between
gaze and choice behavior. The most basic demonstration
of this is that in choice situations, individuals tend to
look for longer at images they later chose (Cavanagh,
Wiecki, Kochar, & Frank, 2014; Fiedler & Glöckner, 2012;
Folke, Jacobsen, Fleming, & De Martino, 2016). This rela-
tionship is also supported by the demonstration that
external manipulation of gaze can induce changes in
choice probabilities (Armel, Beaumel, & Rangel, 2008;
Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). Motivated
by these findings, recent proposals hold that gaze does
not merely sample information during choice, but is
actively involved in constructing preferences (Cavanagh
et al., 2014; Thomas, Molter, Krajbich, Heekeren, &
Mohr, 2019). This reciprocal link between gaze and pref-
erence may reflect a wider, fundamental principle of
value coding—that increased exposure to a stimulus
tends to increase positive affective responses to it. One
classic exemplar of this “exposure-affect coding” comes
from social psychology—the “mere exposure effect” dem-
onstrates that individuals form an increased preference
for a stimulus as a consequence of mere repeated expo-
sure. This effect is robust and generalizes across cultures
and stimulus conditions (Zajonc, 2001).
Increasingly, it is also becoming appreciated that there
are individual differences in the strength of the associa-
tion between gaze and choice (Smith & Krajbich, 2018;
Thomas et al., 2019). For instance, analyzing four-choice
data sets, Thomas et al. (2019) observed that some individ-
uals exhibit choice behaviors that are strongly influenced
by gaze, whereas others exhibit choice behavior that
is almost independent of gaze. A subset of individuals
exhibited strong biases towards choosing items that were
more fixated, to the extent that their choices actually con-
tradicted their previous valuations of the competing stim-
uli. Consequently, modeling these individual differences
in the strength of the gaze–choice relationship led to supe-
rior prediction of choices compared to a model that
assumed the same relationship for each observer. More-
over, these individual differences generalize across diverse
contexts (Smith & Krajbich, 2018)—observers with a
strong gaze–choice relationship in one context exhibited a
strong relationship in another context (e.g., with and
without risk, across food and monetary rewards). Such
observations indicate that the gaze–choice relationship is
some robust trait, rather than reflecting the peculiarities of
specific experimental conditions.
These studies demonstrate the significant individual
variability in this gaze–choice relationship and its impor-
tance for understanding choice behavior. However, it is
unknown how such a relationship may be associated with
other individual-level traits of the observer. For instance,
differences in the gaze–choice relationship may contribute
to some of the social behavioral atypicalities associated
with the autism phenotype. One simple prediction of the
gaze–choice relationship is that stimuli that capture atten-
tion are more likely to be preferred. We would therefore
predict an individual with a strong gaze–choice relation-
ship to develop preferences for salient stimuli that have
evolved to capture attention exogenously early in develop-
ment, such as faces (Shah, Gaule, Bird, & Cook, 2013), or
biological motion patterns (Simion et al. 2008). This bias
would then potentiate a mutual feedback loop that leads
to increased preferences for, and gaze toward social stim-
uli. This trajectory is consistent with behaviors observed
in individuals with low autistic traits (Dubey et al., 2015;
Williams & Cross, 2018). By contrast, we would predict an
individual with a weak gaze–choice relationship to not be
as likely to form preferences for these attention-grabbing
stimuli, predisposing the individual toward social difficul-
ties later in development. This latter trajectory is consis-
tent with behaviors observed in individuals with high
autistic traits (Chevallier et al., 2012; Johnson, 2005).
Taken together, we may therefore predict individuals with
higher autistic traits to exhibit a weaker relationship
between gaze and choice.
The current study examines how autistic traits modulate
gaze behavior, choice behavior and their interaction dur-
ing socially relevant decisions. We test if autistic traits are
predictive of choices between social and nonsocial stimuli.
We then investigate the underlying mechanisms of these
choice behaviors by examining sampling strategies and
temporal trajectories of gaze behavior during choice.
Method
Participants
Our full sample consisted of 53 participants (32 Female,
21 Male, M age = 35.05, SE = 1.79). Thirty of these were
students and staff recruited from the University of Read-
ing campus. In addition to these 30 participants, to
expand the range of autistic traits, we also recruited
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23 adults with a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 4th Edition Text Revision (DSM-IV TR)-
based diagnosis of an ASD from a recognized clinic, who
were recruited through the Centre for Autism database
of research volunteers. To provide a measure of cognitive
ability of these ASD participants, each completed the
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI), which
estimates the participant’s cognitive ability as a percentile
of the general population (Wechsler, 2008). The mean
WASI was 115 (SE = 2.20), indicating a high level of intel-
lectual functioning and cognitive ability comparable to
the University population (Lassiter, Bell, Hutchinson &
Matthews, 2001; Wilson et al., 2014). To provide a mea-
sure of autistic traits, after the experiment, participants
completed the autism quotient (AQ). The AQ scores cap-
tured a wide range of values (range: 8–45, M = 25.9,
SE = 1.76). This range extends to the extreme percentiles
of the distribution of scores typically found in large
Neurotypical (NT) and ASD samples (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001). Moreover, 53 participants provide good statistical
power to detect autism-related differences in social choice
behaviors (see Supporting Information Section S1 for
power calculation). Ethical clearance was obtained from
the University of Reading Ethics Committee, and all par-
ticipants gave fully informed consent.
Stimuli
We employed 30 pairs of static social and nonsocial reward
images, which were the same as those used in Chakrabarti,
Haffey, Canzano, Taylor, and McSorley (2017). Images
were recovered from the international Affective Picture Sys-
tem (Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1997) and publicly avail-
able creative common licensed databases. Social images
were scenes involving happy groups of people, whereas
nonsocial images involved food, natural scenery, and
money (see Supporting Information Section S2 for further
details of selection criteria). To minimize the influence of
extraneous sensory and affective differences between image
pairs, all pairs were matched as closely as possible in terms
of low-level properties (luminance, contrast, Koch saliency)
as well as valence and arousal based on data from a pilot
experiment (see Supporting Information S2 and Figure S1
for further details on matching). Participants were seated
60 cm from a 1280 × 1024 pixel resolution monitor with
an inbuilt Tobii T60 eye tracker. Stimuli subtended
5.59 × 4.19 of visual angle. In addition, to further charac-
terize the influence of low-level confounds, we presented
two stimulus types. One set of images were intact, and
another were phase scrambled. This manipulation main-
tains the mean luminance, contrast, spatial frequency and
colour profile of the intact images, but renders them unre-
cognizable (Figure 1(A)). The logic is that if simple low-level
variability between image pairs drives a bias toward social
images, we would expect to find a social bias of the same
magnitude in the intact and scrambled condition. Stimuli
were presented using MATLAB with Psychtoolbox exten-
sions (Brainard, 1997).
Procedure
Following a 9-point calibration, participants completed
the choice task: Observers were informed that they would
be presented with pairs of images and that they were
required to indicate their preferred image via button
press. Figure 1(B) depicts the trial sequence: In the fixation
phase, observers were presented with a fixation cross
for 500 ms. Subsequently, in the free-inspection phase,
observers were presented with a pair of social and nonso-
cial stimuli until their response was made. Finally, in the
choice phase, a green frame was presented around the
chosen image to indicate the preferred choice. To illus-
trate, Figure 1(C) depicts representative data obtained
from one trial. An observer looks towards each alterna-
tive, implementing a comparison before responding.
Observers completed 240 trials in total (30 image pairs,
2 stimulus types × 4 repetitions). The repeated presenta-
tion of image pairs allowed us to monitor the consistency
of choice responses. This provided us with an index
of how stable each observer’s choice behavior was. In
addition, it allowed us to counterbalance the side of
the display that each image was presented on, thereby
protecting against lateral biases influencing choice. This
measure is important given that the gaze–choice relation-
ship predicts choices biased towards the initially fixated
image (Krajbich & Rangel, 2011)—and that attention is
often initially biased towards the left.
Results
Data reduction and analytic approach
The raw data supporting this article are publicly available
via the “Figshare” repository (Hedger, 2020). Using Grafix
Fixations Coder software (Saez de Urabain, Johnson, &
Smith, 2015), we combined raw gaze coordinates from
the left and right eyes into a single set of X and Y coordi-
nates and smoothed this time series via a bilateral filter-
ing algorithm (Durand & Dorsey, 2002). We interpolated
missing data portions that were briefer than 150 ms. This
150-ms cutoff was based on previous literature that indi-
cates saccadic programming takes around 130 ms and
so interpolations of less than 150 ms should prevent
interpolating an entire saccade-fixation-saccade sequence
(Wass, Smith, & Johnson, 2013). We removed trials for
which gaze failed to record for more than 60% of the trial
(5.02% of the data). Trials corresponding to response
time outliers were defined as being more than 3 SD from
the log-transformed mean RT of each observer (separately
for intact and scrambled trials). Rejecting these trials
removed a further 0.67% of the data.
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Unless specified otherwise, to evaluate hypotheses, we
fit generalized linear mixed effects models. Each fixed
effect that was evaluated was entered into the model with
a corresponding by-subject random slope (Barr, 2013).
Reported p values were obtained by likelihood ratio tests
that compare models with the coefficients to those with-
out them (recommended by Barr, Levy, Scheepers, &
Tily, 2013). Note that since our study was not planned
as, or optimized for a case control design, we employ a
dimensional approach to the analyses (with AQ as the
primary explanatory variable). Nonetheless, for complete-
ness, we also report equivalent group-based analyses (see
Supporting Information Section S3 and Figure S2). These
results are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to
those reported in the present manuscript.
Choice behavior
Choice proportions. Across all stimulus types and
observers, the grand mean indicated that social stimuli
were chosen on 52.70% of trials (SE = 2.02). Choice data
(proportion social images chosen) were analyzed in a
logistic regression model with stimulus type and AQ as
fixed effects. No main effect of stimulus type was detected
χ2 (1) = 0.490, p = 0.751—social stimuli were selected with
equal frequency for both intact and scrambled stimulus
types (intact = 52%, scrambled = 54%). Critically, though,
a robust interaction between AQ and stimulus type was
detected χ2 (1) = 10.99, p = 0.009 (Figure 2(A)). Higher AQ
predicted reduced selection of social stimuli, and this effect
was substantially larger in the intact condition (β = −0.04)
than the scrambled condition (β = −0.01).
Choice consistency. The repetition of each stimulus
pair allowed us to measure the “consistency” of choices.
Low consistency may indicate inattention, or impulsive
responses. For each stimulus pair, we determined the
proportions of “chose social” and “chose nonsocial”
responses and recorded the larger of these values (imply-
ing a minimum consistency of 0.5, and a maximum of 1).
Observers were very consistent in their responses for
intact stimuli (M = 0.96, SE = 0.008) and this consistency
was lowered for scrambled images (M = 0.86, SE = 0.005),
presumably because of the lack of recognizable structure.
No relationship was detected between consistency and
AQ for either stimulus type (intact: r(51) = 0.162,
p = 0.246, scrambled: r(51) = 0.156, p = 0.264).
Figure 1. (A) Schematic of experimental setup. (B) Schematic of trial sequence. (C) Example gaze data. For one representative trial,
horizontal gaze position is plotted as a function of time in the trial. Observers deploy gaze to implement a comparison between the two
images before making a response to indicate their preference. Color indicates the currently fixated image
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Choice latencies. The mean choice latency was
1815.75 ms (SD = 674 ms). Latency data (log response
times - RTs) were analyzed in a general linear model with
choice (chose social, chose nonsocial) stimulus type (intact,
scrambled) and AQ as fixed effects. A three-way interaction
was detected between AQ, stimulus type and stimulus
choice χ2 (1) = 12.60, p = <0.001. There was no interaction
between AQ and choice in the scrambled condition χ2
(1) = 403, p = 0.525. However, critically, in the intact con-
dition, AQ predicted increased choice latency in trials
where social images were chosen (β = 0.0137, p < 0.001),
but not when nonsocial images were chosen (β = 0.002,
p = 0.507). This interaction is depicted in Figure 2(B). Criti-
cally, this is inconsistent with a generalized increase in
response latency in high AQ observers: the increase in
latency was restricted to trials wherein intact social stimuli
were chosen.
The above analyses indicate that autistic traits are asso-
ciated with a reduced preference for, and delayed selec-
tion of social rewards. Importantly, the specificity of
these effects is consistent with reduced social reward res-
ponsivity, not with inattention, generalized slowing of
responses, or basic sensory properties of the stimuli. First,
AQ did not predict consistency of responses. Second, del-
ayed responses were not observed when nonsocial images
were selected. Third, the substantially reduced influence
of AQ in the scrambled condition indicate that these
effects are explained by some semantic evaluation of the
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Figure 2. (A) Probability of choosing a social image is plotted as a function of AQ and stimulus type. (B) Response latency (log
response time) is plotted as a function of AQ and choice. Data are shown for intact images only. (C) Probability of choosing social image
is plotted as a function of the number of switches in gaze between the competing images, AQ and stimulus type. All error bars are ±1
SEM. AQ, autism quotient
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images and not by simple preferences based on low-level
properties. With these effects established, we proceeded
to investigate the oculomotor correlates of these
behaviors.
Relationship between gaze and choice behavior
Switching behavior. The latency of choice responses
(as indexed by RT) is proportional to the uncertainty
regarding the choice. However, a more sensitive measure
may be obtained from eye movements. As an oculomotor
index of choice uncertainty, we calculated the number of
switches in gaze between the competing stimuli. We rea-
soned that a larger number of switches was proportional
to uncertainty regarding the preferred stimulus. Choice
data (proportion social images chosen) were analyzed in a
logistic regression model with number of switches, stimu-
lus type, and AQ as fixed effects. This revealed robust
three-way interaction between AQ, switches, and stimu-
lus type on choice behavior χ2 (1) = 16.80, p < 0.001. This
interaction is depicted in Figure 2(C). The upper panel
shows data for intact images. For low AQ observers,
increased switches predicted a decreased likelihood that
the social image was chosen. By contrast, for higher AQ
observers, increased switches predicted increased likeli-
hood that a social image would be chosen. Expressed dif-
ferently, high AQ predicted high uncertainty in choosing
social images and low uncertainty in choosing nonsocial
images (with the opposite pattern for low AQ). By con-
trast, in trials involving scrambled images (lower panel)
the relationship between switches and choice behavior is
roughly invariant across AQ. Again, this speaks against a
low-level explanation for this effect.
Gaze proportions. Gaze data were collapsed into the
proportion of trial time directed toward the social image.
Choice data (proportion social images chosen) were ana-
lyzed in a logistic regression model with proportion gaze to
social image and AQ as fixed effects. This revealed a main
effect of gaze proportion χ2 (1) = 82.76, p = 0.001, such that
increased gaze to the social image predicted increased likeli-
hood that it was chosen. Critically, an interaction between
AQ and gaze proportion was also detected χ2 (1) = 4.09,
p = 0.040, indicating that the relationship between gaze
and preference was modulated by AQ. These data are
depicted in Figure 3(A). Inspection of this figure reveals a
weaker relationship between gaze and choice behavior in
high AQ individuals.
No higher-level interaction between AQ, gaze propor-
tion and stimulus type was detected, indicating that the
dissociation between gaze and choice was not specific to
socially-relevant decisions χ2 (1) = 0.08, p = 0.780. To fur-
ther investigate these varying gaze–choice relationships,
we proceeded to fit individual-level models for each
observer (Figure 3(B)). We then used Akaike’s information
criteria to compare the fit of an empty (intercept only)
model to a model with gaze proportion as a predictor
of choice probability. Fifty-two of 53 observers data were
better explained by the gaze model. There was, however,
substantial individual variation in the degree of model
improvement (Figure 3(C)). Consistent with the above
analyses, AQ was negatively associated with model
improvement—higher AQ was associated with a reduced
influence of gaze on choice behavior r(51) = −0.351,
p = 0.009.
Temporal relationship between gaze and choice. To
determine how this relationship between gaze and choice
behavior evolved over the duration of the trial, we first
normalized time series data relative to stimulus onset. The
data were then partitioned into 20 linearly spaced time
bins from stimulus onset (0) to the time of the response
(1). Figure 4(A), which depicts the group-averaged data,
reveals a standard “gaze cascade” effect (Shimojo
et al., 2003). At the start of the trial, both images are
inspected roughly equally, but in the moments leading up
to making a choice, the proportion of gaze towards the
chosen image increases. To establish the onset of this “cas-
cade” effect for each observer, we used a bootstrapping
procedure to determine the earliest point at which gaze
remained reliably predictive of the ensuing choices until
the choice was made (see Supporting Information Sec-
tion S4). These estimated onsets, which are shown by the
vertical lines in Figure 4(B), capture the points of diver-
gence quite well. There was substantial variability in
onsets, ranging from prior to half way through the nor-
malized trial duration (0.40) to the final portion of the
trial (0.95). Critically, we detected a main effect of AQ on
onset latency χ2 (1) = 4.12, p = 0.040. Consistent with the
weaker gaze–choice relationship for high AQ observers,
this indicates that higher AQ also tended to predict a
later gaze cascade onset (Figure 4(C)). We observed no
interaction between stimulus type and AQ χ2 (1) = 0.73,
p = 0.390 on onsets. Again, this indicates that the effect of
AQ on the interaction between gaze and choice behavior
was not restricted to socially relevant decisions.
Discussion
In this study, we observed that autistic traits predict dif-
ferences in social choice behaviors, and the role of gaze
in influencing choices. We found that a higher level of
autistic traits predict later and less frequent selection of
social rewards. This is consistent with behavioral para-
digms that have indicated that individuals with high
autistic traits invest less effort to receive social engage-
ment (Dubey et al., 2015; Dubey et al., 2017). Critically,
we found no evidence to indicate that differences in
choice latencies were driven by generalized motoric
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influences, or an impulsive decision-making process. This
suggests that the mechanism for selection of social stim-
uli results from a higher-level evaluation of the stimuli,
rather than on low-level influences or domain-general
differences in task performance. Additionally, our ana-
lyses of gaze switches revealed greater uncertainty in
selecting social stimuli for high AQ observers—an effect
that was not replicated with scrambled stimuli.
Extending recent reports (Smith & Krajbich, 2018), we
found substantial individual differences in the relationship
between gaze and choice behavior. This finding emphasises
the importance of modeling these individual differences, in
line with recent proposals (Molter, Thomas, Heekeren, &
Mohr, 2019). Critically, we found that AQ predicted a
weaker relationship between gaze and choice behavior. In
high AQ observers, an increase in gaze towards a stimulus
predicted a smaller increase in the probability it would be
chosen. Moreover, we found that gaze became predictive of
choice later in the trial for high AQ observers.
What could be the mechanism that underlies these
effects? One plausible interpretation is that in high AQ
individuals, more sampling of, or exposure to a stimulus
is required to support positive evaluations. This is
consistent with observations from diverse strands of litera-
ture that indicate wider atypicalities in exposure-affect cod-
ing in ASD. For instance, psychophysiological studies
indicate delayed habituation to novel stimuli in ASD—
relative to neurotypicals, more exposure to stimuli is
required before negative arousal is attenuated (Guiraud
et al., 2011; Perry, Minassian, Lopez, Maron, &
Lincoln, 2007). A related finding is that high autistic traits
are also associated with an increased preference for familiar
stimuli (Gustafsson & Paplinski, 2004; Pellicano &
Burr, 2012). Moreover, neuroimaging work has indicated
reduced activity in the ventral striatum (implicated in tem-
poral aspects of value coding) in response to rewards in
ASD (Scott-Van Zeeland, Dapretto, Ghahremani,
Poldrack, & Bookheimer, 2010). At the behavioral level,
some initial work has also indicated delayed “mere expo-
sure” effects in ASD—liking ratings of individuals with ASD
have not been found to scale with repeated exposures in
the same way as NT individuals (Filliter, 2014).
One important thing to note is that the observed inter-
actions between AQ and gaze on choice behavior were
not modulated by stimulus type—indicating that the
effects generalize beyond socially relevant stimuli. The
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Figure 3. (A) Probability of choosing the social image is plotted as a function of the proportion of gaze to the social image, AQ and
stimulus type. Panel headers indicate AQ scores. (B) Individual model fits. (C) The improvement in model performance (as assessed by
Akaike’s information criterion) made by a gaze model relative to an empty model, as a function of AQ. AQ, autism quotient
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Figure 4. (A) Proportion of gaze to the social image as a function of normalized trial time, choice and stimulus type. (B) The same
data for each individual observer (left = intact stimuli, right = scrambled stimuli). Vertical lines indicate the onset of the gaze cascade
effect estimated from the bootstrapping procedure. (C) The estimated onset of the gaze cascade effect as a function of AQ and
stimulus type
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generality of this effect may be consistent with neuroim-
aging data, which indicate that differences in reward
coding in ASD are not restricted to social stimuli, and
are more generalized than initially suspected (Dawson,
Webb, & McPartland, 2005; Schultz, 2005). Why might a
domain-general alteration in exposure-affect coding be
associated with traits that index atypical social behaviors?
The explanation may be simple. Borrowing concepts
from classical conditioning, exposure to a stimulus alone
may lead to the formation of a preference due to the sim-
ple absence of aversive consequences. Such a mechanism
likely provides a primitive, fundamental basis for promot-
ing engagement with social stimuli (Zajonc, 2001).
The clearest demonstrations of this are phenomena
such as imprinting effects, where neonates narrow their
social preferences as a simple consequence of exposure
(Bateson, 1966). Atypical, or delayed exposure-affect cod-
ing may therefore disrupt preferences for engaging with
social stimuli. By extension, this reduced engagement has
been proposed to impede learning of skills vital to suc-
cessful for social functioning, such as language acquisi-
tion and face/emotion recognition (Johnson, 2005;
Schultz, 2005).
In discussing diminished preferences for social stimuli,
it is important not to neglect discussion of preferences
for nonsocial stimuli—and to acknowledge that these
are ‘two sides of the same coin.” For instance, another
related strand of literature is concerned with the restricted
and repetitive behaviors and interests associated with
autism. Such behaviors, which involve an insistence on
sameness and preoccupying restricted interests are well
documented—but the neurobiological basis of such
behaviors are still emerging (Kohls, Yerys, & Schultz,
2014). The rewarding effect of restricted-interest stimuli
is thought to reflect a preference for predictability in
the environment. Notably, such restricted interest stimuli
are typically more stable and predictable than social
stimuli, which are typically diverse and volatile (Kohls
et al., 2014). Because such stimuli are more circumscribed,
and possess more immediate and reliable reinforcement
contingencies than social stimuli, preferences for these
stimuli may be formed more readily in individuals with
disrupted exposure-affect coding. Consequently, such
restricted interest stimuli may co-opt the reward circuitry
typically allocated to social stimuli (Watson et al., 2015)
and hijack the typical trajectory of social-seeking behav-
iors. Thus, an important goal of future studies is to exam-
ine this inherent interplay between social and nonsocial
reward responsivity throughout development.
In interpreting our findings, we reiterate that gaze both
reflects and influences choice behavior in a mutually
interactive manner. Although some authors have posited
that gaze drives choice (Armel et al., 2008; Pärnamets
et al., 2015), a challenge to this claim is that attention
may merely reflect emerging preferences (Shimojo et al.,
2003). There is good evidence, however, that gaze
does not merely reflect preference, but itself is actively
involved in forming preferences. For instance, directly
manipulating gaze duration (not just exposure duration)
can bias choice to the fixated location (Shimojo et al.,
2003). Moreover, computational models wherein fixa-
tions guide the choice process can provide unique, pre-
cise predictions about idiosyncratic properties of choice
behavior. For instance, modeling the role of fixations in
the choice process can predict why preferences tend to be
biased towards the first fixated item, why choice behav-
iors sometimes conflict with previous valuations of the
stimuli (Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010) and why choice
latencies are inversely proportional to the overall valua-
tion of the two choice options (Smith & Krajbich, 2019).
Thus, the gaze–choice relationship is bidirectional. It is
therefore most sensible to interpret our data as reflecting
individual variation in a positive feedback loop, within
which gaze and preference are intrinsically linked.
Methodologically, our data emphasize the importance
of including controls for low-level confounds in studies
of social attention—we found that a measurable portion
of observer preferences were driven by low-level proper-
ties of the stimuli (Figure 2A). This accords with an obser-
vation from a recent free-viewing experiment, wherein
gaze bias toward social images was partly explained
by low-level properties of the stimuli (Hedger, Haffey,
McSorley, & Chakrabarti, 2018). Future studies of social
attention should include control stimuli that allow sim-
ple low-level influences on behavior to be characterized.
It is noteworthy that our data appear inconsistent
with an earlier eye-tracking study that observed no differ-
ences between ASD and NT groups in terms of gaze cas-
cade trajectories or social choice behaviors (Gharib, Mier,
Adolphs, & Shimojo, 2015). In context, however, the dif-
ferences between this study and our own may outweigh
the similarities. First, our study involved trials with direct
competition between two complex social and nonsocial
stimuli, whereas Gharib et al. implemented a comparison
between two face stimuli. In addition, it is possible that
our larger sample size and dimensional approach to the
analyses may have had additional sensitivity to detect
individual differences.
In interpreting our findings, it is important to do so in
the context of several limitations. First, the choice behav-
iors in our experiment are a symbolic, and imperfect ana-
logue of the relevant real-world social behaviors. For
instance, if observers actually received what is represented
by the preferred image (e.g., joining the interaction
depicted in the image) then this would likely alter choice
behavior. This is important in the context of a recent,
novel study that indexed forced choices between actually
engaging in (as opposed to simply observing) social and
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nonsocial activities, which found no difference between
ASD and NT observers (Goldberg et al., 2017). By exten-
sion, it is important to acknowledge that the choice data
presented here may be better described as reflecting res-
ponsivity to social rewards, rather than social motivation
per se. As highlighted by recent reviews, behavioral stud-
ies indicating a lack of social motivation often conflict
with the testimony of the individuals themselves (Jaswal
and Akhtar, 2018).
It is also important to note that in addition to social
reward responsivity, autistic traits are associated with
other more generalized differences in perceptual and
information-processing styles. Those relevant to our task
may include a sharper attentional gradient (Robertson,
Kravitz, Freyberg, Baron-Cohen, & Baker, 2013), impaired
temporal integration (Nakano, Ota, Kato, & Kitazawa,
2010), and a precedence of a local over global processing
style (Lowe, Stevenson, Barense, Cant, & Ferber, 2018). In
the absence of robust measures of these domains, we
were unable to formally characterize their role on gaze
and choice behaviors. Finally, it is important to note the
inherent social context that might color the valuation of
nominally “nonsocial” stimuli. Stimulus categories such
as food and money have their own inherent value—but
part of their valuation is linked to social interactions. Part
of the valuation of money may relate to social exchanges,
and food valuations may relate to the association with
social gatherings. Despite these interpretive cautions, the
data indicate that the responsivity to these reward catego-
ries and the relation between gaze and choice behavior
vary as a function of autistic traits.
In summary, our data demonstrate that autistic traits
predict reduced and delayed selection of social stimuli
during choice. Critically, during such choices, autistic
traits predicted a weaker and delayed relationship
between gaze and preference. Considered with previous
findings, this result implies that domain-general atypical-
ities in exposure-affect coding may contribute to atypical
social functioning observed in individuals with high
autistic traits.
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(b) Response latency (log response time) is plotted as a
function of group and choice. Data are shown for intact
images only. (c) Probability of choosing social image is
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(d) Probability of choosing the social image is plotted as a
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